Reading list (2022)

Editorial: At the Edge of the Empire

• the red dust/Du Mu reading is pretty good
• references to Camatte, Sohn-Rethel are cringue
• i find the Camatte impulse to see everything as totally ultra subsumed into capital suspicious at best
  • haven't read Camatte himself very much or in a long time, but looking back at it. he says it overcomes the law of value?? lol
  • it's always something about finance…i don't know anything about finance

Red Dust: The Capitalist Transition in China

1. Introduction: Hermitage

   • "Moreover, this workforce had been produced by the socialist developmental regime, so its initial costs were external to capitalist production and the costs of its reproduction were easily externalized to internal peripheries still dominated by subsistence production—at least for the first couple generations." go off
   • 3 decades of capitalist transition
     • 1969–78: politically defined
       • 1969 Zhenbao Island Incident — split with USSR
       • informal then formal contact with US
       • trying to reverse developmental regime economic stagnation by acquiring goods
       • creates (agro) supply dependencies, encourages more liberalization
     • 1978–89 (Deng to Tiananmen): domestic econ reform
       • household responsibility system in agro
       • rural market restoration
       • Township & Village Enterprises
       • insulation from global market except thru Special Economic Zones e.g. Shenzhen interface with Hong Kong
       • no domestic stock exchange, domestic firm ownership unclear, foreign ownership only in SEZs and restricted
       • Hong Kong main source of direct investment (second: jp), +indirect investment, from Taiwan/etc.
       • hence investment from broader sinosphere, formation of top of capitalist class hierarchy—capital fuses with dev regime bureaucracy
     • 1990–early 2ks: international, completion of transition (market integration, class formation)
       • re-incorporation of students into party/ruling class
       • soc dev regime rulers begin pursuing accumulation—aided by class/state fusion
       • more investment from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea. Shenzhen+Shanghai stock exchanges est. 1990
       • export orientation, often to west—coastal TVEs integrated—wave of sub/exurban industrialization→megacity sprawl
       • northeast soc indust belt gutted: factory closures, mass layoffs
         • grain-consuming urb indust worker privilege removed—soc dev regime class structure gone
         • temporary countryside cheap grain production mandate to blunt urban unrest risk
         • many poor rural TVEs from 80s bankrupt/privatized/shut down
         • TVEs were transitional in industry reform: privatization→market growth, shutdown→surplus labor for coastal manufacture
         • state-owned industries restructured: consolidation into capitalized "conglomerates"
         • cn workforce: new migrant proletariat for private owned Sunbelt industries + new proles for party-overseen internationally-financed congloms
       • loosely ends 2001: cn joins WTO, manufact employment troughs at 11%
         • "complete transition in some places only 2008 or later"
         • coastal cities become definitive econ center
         • transition completed b/c iron rice bowl destruction+rural outmigration=proletarian class
         • imminent rapid reentry of global capitalism
   • exaption of soc dev regime features
     • hukou system→rural migrant prole pop for coastal sunbelt
     • collective land ownership→tradable land use rights (2008), agro market reforms
     • party system (pol/tech elite fusion)→90s enterpreneur influx
     • State-Owned Enterprises in steel/mining/energy/… not fully privatized, rather party acts as capitalist
       • integral to international econ expansion but plagued by debt/overproduction/eco-collapse externalized from private econ

2. 1. Pacific Rim: International Conditions

   1. Overview: Encirclement

      • "potential" for Qing capitalist transition beaten by Japan, split b/w euro capital commercial enclaves / imperial jp colonies
        • cold war ultimately continues indust project of beaten jp under us mil tutelage
        • line goes down lol. counteracted by expanded markets+new labor sources, "spatial fix"
      • old guard in an industry dragged down by obsolute facilities: national and local scale
        • mass migration to new centers, then rustbelt decline
      • zero-sum competition drove jp then hk/singapore/taiwan/south korea
        • cycle of new dev → decay eventually produces gap china can enter

   2. The Failed Transition

      • southern coastline role in commerce dating to post-Tang Silk Road decline
        • counterforces to commercialization
        • trade networks tend to become pirate navies e.g. Zheng Chenggong/Koxinga taking Taiwan
        • Qing banned coastal navigation and depopulated area
        • Taiwan conquered by Qing 1663, european capitalist creeping in
        • trade significant but wary Qing imposing monopolies, restrictions
        • 1757–1842 Canton system routed all foreign trade through Guangzhou
        • ended by euro colonial incursion (Opium wars 1838–1842, 1856–1860)
      • Qing valuable for export labor, domestic labor, raw materials, land
        • factory districts in coast cities—incorporation into global capitalism, de facto separate from Qing
        • early capitalism largely in foreign hands
      • interwar capital+proletarianization centered on Shanghai, Guangzhou under euro+jp capital
        • not seeing how this is a "failed transition." the Qing didn't want to become capitalist, and they didn't. doesn't seem like less aggression from foreign capital would have encouraged them.

   3. Constructing East Asia

      • euro pressure in japan → Meiji Restoration 1868–1912, industrialization, political/social reform
      • success proven in quick 1st Sino-JP War 1894–5 over Korean Peninsula, jp takes Liaodong peninsula, invades Manchuria, demands Taiwan (still has to occupy)
      • jp appeases worrying western powers. but then Russo-JP war 1904–5 (jp win again)
      • korea supposedly free but occupied by jp semi-autonomous Kwantung Army, formal annexation 1910
        • similar in Manchuria. Manchukuo est. 1931
      • domestic support for militarism, racial logic, etc.
        • zaibatsu monopoly corps
        • saturated domestic market, gap left by british empire, great depression→imperial expansion
        • spoke/wheel jp/colonies interregional trade
      • capitalist east asia encircling china

   4. Total Wars

      • jp fascism result of capitalism
        • late 10s econ boom, stagnation 1920s, 1927 Showa Financial Crisis, 1930 Showa Depression
        • Showa Depression recovery quick
          • Takahashi (Korekiyo) Economic Policy: keynesian spending, monetary depreciation, decoupling from gold standard
          • 1932–36 GNP growth back to boom levels w/ moderate inflation
      • could not fix rate of profit. expansionary program
        • Takehashi assassinated by Kōdō-ha faction 1935 when attempting to reduce govt spending
        • wartime command economy begins: high GNP growth, increasing inflation
      • imperial military supposed to correct corrupted zaibatsu. mythical imperial fascism etc.
        • Kōdō-ha opposed by more cautious equally-fascist Tōsei-ha which gains power 1936 after Kōdō-ha purged
      • germanic total war theory
        • Kishi Nobusuke, economic manager of Manchukuo/huge slavery fan
        • same economic policies continued after the war. Kishi put in charge by US even!
        • new anti-communist military bloc, same total war

   5. The Export of Capital to the East

      • US interest in east asia from late 1890s (annexation of Hawai‘i, Phillippines occupation)
        • same motives as jp: escape gilded age stagnation
        • shift in interests after war: anti-socbloc strategy + R&D upsurge
        • wartime logistics transferred to civilians
        • export of capital goods requires coordination: promote dictators to oversee pacific developmental states, like marshall plan+welfare states in europe
      • E/SE Asia intnat prod order under US based on jp imp relationships
        • uneven dev fund distribution, jp first
      • jp loss of colonies with fixed capital actually spurs tech redevelopment (really??)
      • mass of demobilized soldiers form surplus labor force (aren't those guys gonna be hard to manage lol)
        • informal work, scall-scale subsistence networks—self-employed/peasantry/family workers=60.6% workforce (1950)
      • jp econ growth made easy by US money/military regimes
        • special procurement program: jp supplying US for korean war 1950–53
        • occupation formally ends 1951
      • early C20 econ blocs slowly give way post-Korean War
        • market for jp exports
        • Bretton Woods system pegs dollar to yen at fixed rate
        • skyrocketing jp profit, late 60s peak in manufact
      • domestic market↑, jp worker consumption↑
        • flood of jp exports, expanding fixed capital
        • fixed capital decouples from non-residential investment: beginning of rise of real estate bubble that would contribute to collapse

   6. Stagnation

      • GDP growth declining incore economy as early as 60s. US profit rate postwar peak middle of 60s
        • jp national+manufacturing profit rates peak ~mid60s–70
      • boom uneven, stagnation uneven
        • high-GDP nations have obsolete fixed capital
        • long boom sustained by later-developers while early ones already stagnating
        • unemployment, public fiscal crises, stagflation, oil crisis, high military expenditures
      • globally: recessionary cycles, trade/currency wars b/w US and competitors
      • US in debt and manufacuring↓ in 70s, japan extends credit + exports
        • but jp manufacturing profit rate does not fully recover. low peak early/mid 80s, then plummet
        • general profit rate no recovery at all, stagnation then 1990 decline
      • global manufacturing trade a 0 sum game. 1985 Plaza Accord, US does well at expense of jp
        • shows jp had not escaped early 70s overproduction profit rate crisis
        • only export and financial speculation available

   7. The Flying Geese

      • "flying geese" meme imagines jp as tech/finance leader and once a line of work becomes unprofitable (labor expensive) there it moves to taiwan/south korea/hong kong/singapore
        • simply ignores economic crisis and political influence of US
        • originally formulated by 30s imperial jp economist lol
      • jp doing foreign direct investment, gives loans as "war reparations"

   8. The Shadow Play

      • labored metaphor about how the flying geese are fake, created by the US, created by capital
      • le gothic cthulhu vampire capital. stfu. someone should have told them to scrap this stuff in editing
      • muh material community. don't you find it suspicious that the guy who originated this rhetoric, in which capital's abstract manipulation is more important than the actors it employs, now claims that class isn't even important, that capital has moved beyond it?
      • refuting teh tankies doesn't require you to do this

   9. Logistics

      • wave of east asian economic booms powered by war + desparation of western/jp firms to recover profit
        • really wish i understood anything about finance at all. people talk about it like it's undergone (or tried to undergo) a sort of detachment from the real world but i don't get the mechanics
        • capital goes for mobility, finding pockets of pre-marketized labor to exploit hard before unrest strikes. brief booms
      • enabled by tech advances from US military complex. digital tech
        • profitiability increased by computerization of industrial process
      • shipping/logistics advances to globalize US manufacturing
        • containerization, computer JIT stuff
        • long-distance shipping costs↓, deep draft seaports→new shipping geography
        • smaller ports starved
      • 9/10 top container shipping ports in pacific rim, 6 mainland china
        • earliest were in jp
      • originates from WWII concepts, korean war infrastructure
      • logistics revolution result of global profitability downturn
        • cheaper labor, faster turnover

Part II: Essays

1. 1. On the Dao

   • the way came about gradually “due to the nature and logic of the situations these rulers were in”; the institutions created by sages were not “instances of their giving rein to their fancy”—kind of historical materialism
   • we can extend the analogy to a contrast with utopianism: Zhang says the way is ont really for scholars, it’s for someone in a position to implement it (i.e. a sovereign or official, to him). hence it’s a waste of time for someone without the position to implement things to bother coming up with ideas
     • note 59 refers it to ch. 28 of the Doctrine of the Mean: people need to see a proposal in action for it to matter, so you need both proper position/authority and wisdom+charisma (Virtue)
   • the classics are 器 not 道
   • the warring states schools were only descriptions from limited views of the Way (like Zhuangzi ch. 33 says)
   • deictic notion of the dao!! like how you say “our” army and don’t use surnames among your family

2. 2. On Learning

   • study what is below to understand what is above

3. 3. A Treatise on Teachers

   • Han Yu said you can learn from anyone but Zhang says you need an irreplaceable teacher, for the dao at least. but where can such a thing be found?
   • in books! like an orphan finding a portrait of his father. i’ve felt that

Part III: Letters

1. 4. Letter on Learning to Chen Jianting

   • “the great task of ordering their age” (great phrase)

Appendices: Three Works by Han Yu

1 The Geographic and Environmental Background

1. Defining “China”

   • China known internally by dynasty name during imperial period
   • no common identity till Western Zhou
   • borders of “China” have fluctuated
   • “multi-regional” genesis of China used as model for this book

2. The Topography of China

   • focus includes “China proper” around Yelow and Yangzi rivers but also extends further and talks about outside interactions
   • ancient population primarily concentrated in east except Sichuan basin and Wei River basin
   • mountains perpendicular to Himalayas divide up China into belts
     • Qinling range divides Yangzi and Yellow River basins: boundary between north and south China
     • Taihang and Yan mountains mark plains of north China, separate them from norther steppe and forest zones
     • Nanling range separates Yangzi River basin from subtropical regions to south
   • movement in antiquity was easier by river and land east-west, hard north-south: shapes interregional interactions
     • improved under Sui and Tang with digging of Great Canal connecting Yangzi and Yellow basins
   • Yellow River carries lots of loess (soil, hence yellow color), causes fertility but periodic stoppage and flooding until it finds new path
   • Yangzi = Changjiang, “long river.” does not tend to flood, better for navigation
   • Han River frlows from north into Yangzi, valley is natural route between two basins
   • Wei and Liao Rivers also centers of human occupation northeast of Yellow River basin
   • Xi He (lower part is Pearl River Zhujiang), most important in modern times but significant prehistorically too

3. The Climate of China

   • determined by
     1. latitude: north = colder, drier
     2. distance from ocean: farther = drier
     3. altitude: higher = colder
   • west is higher and farther from ocean than east. climatic belts run diagonally from northeast to southwest
   • precipitation
     • in winter, high pressure over north-central asia pushes cold air south along eastern edge of Tibetan Plateau into north and central China: cold and winds
     • in summer, temperature differential between Indian/Pacific Oceans and land bring warm, moist air into continent, hits cooler interior air
     • Indian monsoon: heavy precipitation from southwest China to Himalayas + Tibetan/Qinghai Plateaus
     • East Asian summer monsoon from Pacific is main rain source in south China, goes up to Yellow River basin, beyond to northeast
     • summer is rainy season, esp. April-September
   • 4 climatic belts
     1. northern forest, steppe, desert zone
        • from Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces in northeast (formerly Manchuria) through Inner Mongolia to Xinjiang. borders of China proper
        • relatively harsh. has some of driest deserts on earth
        • extreme temperatures, wide difference between summer and winter, day and night
     2. Yellow River basin
        • north-ish, latitude 42–33
        • relatively cold winters, ~freezing at Yellow River, low of -5° to north
        • yearly precip. 250–750mm in eastern parts
     3. Yangzi River basin
        • 33–27° latitude north. more moderate. winter rarely below freezing, summer not too hot.
        • yearly precip. 1,000–1,500mm
     4. southern subtropical region
        • to south of Nanling mountain range. mountainous, many rivers and narrow valleys
        • stable temperatures, high during winter, not hot in summer
        • summer monsoons bring much rain. 1,600mm+ yearly

4. Vegetation and Economic Potential

   • varied natural vegetation
   • availability of arable land vital for early agriculture
   • Yellow River: millet and soy
   • Yangzi even better. rice first domesticated here

5. Ancient Climatic and Geographic Changes and Their Effects

   • 21k-15k years ago peak of last Glacial Age
   • ~11,500kya period of cold, dry
   • rapid rise of Himalayas in Paleolithic period

2 Before Cultivation:Human Origins and the Incipient Development of Human Culture in China

1. Archaeological Evidence for Early Human Occupation in China

   • Zhoukoudian site discovered by J.G. Andersson, 1921

   1. The Chronological Setting

      • Paleolithic knowledge of China rudimentary compared to other places
      • perception is long and stable period (probably because we lack info on regions and types of tools)
      • dates
        • Lower Paleolithic: 1.7–0.78 million years ago (MA)
        • Middle Paleolithic: 0.78–0.13MA
        • Upper Paleolithic: 0.13–0.025 MA (i.e. 25,000 years before present)

   2. The Earliest Sites

      • Longgupo: earliest evidence of human activity?
      • Renzidong
      • Majuangou

   3. Early Paleolithic Sites

      • Nihewan basin sites: core-and-flake tools
        • Majuangou III
        • Xiaochangliang
        • Donggutou
        • Banshan
      • hominin remains in Lantian and Xihoudu sites

   4. Middle and Late Paleolithic Sites

      • many more notable middle/late sites
      • Zhoukoudian
        • frequent re-occupation
        • suitable stones for tools (quartz) brought from up to 2km away
        • use of fire seems plausible
        • animal remains probably scavenged after being killed by carnivores: not hunted
        • Upper Cave
          • perforated animal teeth, shells, calcareous stones (probably beads). some colored with red hematite
          • possibly deliberate burial and grave goods

2. The Study of Hominin Remains and the Origins of Human Populations in China

   • main candidates for earliest hominin fossils both from southern part of China
     • Longgupo, Chongqing: mandible fragment and teeth attributed to H. habilis or H. erectus, 1.9MA
     • Yuanmou, Yunnan: two incisors, H. erectus, 1.8–0.6MA
     • both inevitably questionable

   1. The “Out of Africa” Model

      • one-wave model of H. erectus Out of Africa denied by Chinese finds?

   2. The Origins of Homo Sapiens and Modern Human Population in China

      • Out of Africa 2 says H. sapiens evolved in Africa then moved out, supplanting H. erectus
      • conventionally we think existing human variation is recent
      • perhaps initial migration (0.22MA) followed by another that brought Upper Paleolithic tool kit (0.055MA or later)
      • multiregional hypothesis suggests H. sapiens evolved indepedently out of H. erectus in different parts of Afroeurasia
        • “candelabra” model
        • support from prominent Chinese archaeologists: seen by many Western scholars as reflecting nationalist bias
      • admixture hypothesis maintains importance of African origins in development of modern humans but allows genetic contribution from non-African population
        • Europeans are a bit Neanderthal, but not Africans
        • Melanesians share genes with ca.50kya skeleton from Denizova Cave
        • need sequencing of early hominins

3. Stone Tools and the Spread of Human Culture

   • model of two broad traditions coexisting
     • small-artifact tradition: irregular retouched flakes
       • early sites such as Donggutuo, Zhoukoudian locality I, Xujiayao
       • associated with rise of microlithic tradition in Late Paleolithic/Early Neolithic
     • large-artifact tradition: chopper-chopping artifacts, heavy triangular points
       • early sites such as Xihoudu and Lantian (Early Paleolithic), Dingcun, culminated with polished stone tools of Neolithic period
     • significance of dichotomy unclear. different types of economic adaptation? stylistic norms? coexisting societies? how would they maintain separate identities?
     • will probably be dissolved with more research
   • core-and-flake industries of north China vs cobble-tool ones of south
   • scarcity of bifaces
   • hypothesis that stone tools were used to make more developed bamboo ones which did not survive

3 The Transition to Food Production: Variability and Processes

• human society like this depends on existence of agriculture
• China a primary center of indepedent agricultural development

1. What Is Agriculture?

   1. cultivation
      • intervening in nature to secure better harvests. archaeologically visible
   2. domestication
      • human modifications of other species. not intentional
   3. system of knowledge
      • need to know about crop rotation etc. accumulated knowledge has to be transmitted forward and sideways

2. Hunter-Gatherers vs. Agriculturalists: How Different Are They?

   • dichotomy questionable
     • HGs also modify environment
     • HGs can have social hierarchy etc.
   • shift to agriculture should be seen as process, not event

3. Archaeological Evidence for the Transition to Agriculture in China

   • should show long trajectory
   • but we can’t document it yet. other places are better known than China

4. North China

   • by second half of 7th millennium BCE (8,500 years ago), sedentary agricultural communities populated most of middle and lower Yellow River basin and regions to its north
   • substantial portion of human diet at these sites probably derived from agriculture
   • large communities (up to 200–300 people), perennial residency, long duratio of community in single place: permanent houses, public structures, defined cemeteries

8 The Shang Dynasty:The Emergence of the State in China

1. The Archaeology of the Shang Polity

   • Shang dynasty here dated to ca. 1600–1050 BCE
     • Early Shang: 1600–1400 BCE
       • Zhengzhou, Yanshi, Panloncheng sites: Erligang phase [is this really Shang?]
       • many sites not fortified. but hangtu foundations indicates elite residency?
     • Middle Shang: 1400–1300 BCE
       • Huanbei site
         • abandoned 1300 BCE
     • Late Shang: 1300–1050 BCE
       • Yinxu/Anyang/Xiaotun site
   • for most if not all of that time, dominated the central and lower parts of the Yellow River basin

   1. City Organization and Public Structures

      • walled enclosures in early and middle Shang
      • late Shang (Xiaotun) not fortified
      • cemeteries at Xiaotun (Xibeigang royal cemetery) indicate lineage system, different from nucleated cities of early/middle Shang such as Zhengzhou

   2. Cemeteries, Burials, and Ritual Activity

      • Late Shang sites show clear social stratification in difference between poor and rich graves
      • pit victims are non-Shang captives as opposed to Shang retainers

   3. Craft Production and Technology

      • nonlocal raw materials for prestige artifacts and general purposes
        • tin and copper for bronze
        • semiprecious stones such as jade, marble, turquoise
        • materials for making lacquer
        • cowrie shells
        • turtle shells for divination [scapula too: tribute]

2. The Oracle Bone Inscriptions

   • Shang oracle bone divination is a continuation of a tradition well-established throughout north China by Late Neolithic, but with greater intensity, standardized and politicized. inscriptions on the bones a Shang innovation

3. Shaman or Technocrats? The Religious Functions and Leadership Strategies of Shang Kings

   • K.C. Chang, Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China¹ : says power and prestige of Shang kings was related to shaman role. specialists communicating with spirits, resolving social contradiction. anmials as assistants to shaman, cosmic vehicles
   • Bagley disagrees, says Shang bronze decoration motifs (animals) not connected to shamanism
   • oracle inscriptions suggest formalistic, structured ritual. no indication of trance. bureaucratic

4. The Structure and Evolution of the Shang State

   • extent of Shang territory
     • minimalist: small area in northern and central Henan provice
     • maximalist: entire Yellow and Wei River basins, areas to the north, parts of Yangzi River basin
     • dynamic: territory changed much. initial rapid military expansion included core area in Henan, parts of Shaanxi (lower Wei) and Shanxi (middle Yellow), western Shandong, middle Yangzi. shift eastward and gradual retreat from west happened during late Early Shang, Middle Shang. center of polity shifted north to Anyang. territory shrunk drastically in Late Shang
   • counterpoint: borders were not clear. oracle bones suggest state was not one thing but a fluid coalition with other groups. Shang king not certai he would receive local leaders’ support, had to divine about it
   • 3 concentric regions without clear borders
     1. center: Shang capital and territories adjacent, directly controlled by Shang court
     2. land populated by allies or potential allies: the Four Lands si tu
        • estimated Shang king spent half time traveling here with court hunting, performing rituals, demonstrating powers, gaining legitimacy, maintaining alliance
     3. enemies’ lands: -fang. did not divine about harvests for them, numerous mentions of war [note shift to “Zhoufang”]
   • Shelach-Lavi disagress that weak Shang system at Anyang was due to demise of more powerful, centralized one in Early Shang
     • Xibeigang tombs much more impressive than earlier ones
     • Early Shang resources and labor used for public projects (walls of Zhengzhou), Late Shang investments associated with persona of king or courtiers
   • specialization, division of labor
     • but overall impression of generalized administrative system. official titles e.g. servitor chen denote ad hoc appointments, not permanent positions
     • king portrayed as personally responsible for ordering or inspecting mundane tasks such as opening new fields

   1. The State Economy of the Shang Polity

      • clearly the Shang court needed a lot of resources, but unclear how they got them
        • tributes mostly relate to rituals. what abt fundamentals?
      • an explanation: the king owned all land under Shang control, hence “my”/“our” fields, agricultural inspection
        • farmers organized in zhongren work groups managed by state officials
      • certainly had no stable control over Four Lands, yet divined about their harvests: i.e. had some interest in their prosperity
        • legitimizes his religous position if they do well? helps him gain support
        • can extract manpower, food tribute even if without systematically levying taxes
          • [the body of the despot overcodes things, acts as quasi-cause!! i.e. he takes divine responsibility for production]
      • royal hunt as state-level economic mechanism
        • most frequently divined subject, very important activity
        • expeditions showed off power
        • large number of animals caught
        • primitive tax mechanism? when the king’s entourage passes through, you have to be ready to give them provisions
      • craft production (esp. bronzes)
        • state-run system. artifacts distributed among court, to local elite
        • Shang bronzes beyond political control of Shang: networks of gift exchange with other elites
      • bone industry: mixed elite/nonelite interests
        • some products for elite but high scale production and practical nature of artifacts good for other things
        • pins, awls, arrowheads, shovels: distributed in exchange for products/services? market system?
      • little known about villages but presumably self-sufficient

   2. Power, Institution, and Legitimation: A Model of the Shang State

      • some sacrifices captured in wars. expeditions specifically to get captives
      • why the waste? Shang king’s legitimacy depends on doing rituals